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A B S T R A C T
Background: Cannabis Social Clubs (CSCs) are a model of non-profit production and distribution of
cannabis among a closed circuit of adult cannabis users. CSCs are now operating in several countries
around the world, albeit under very different legal regimes and in different socio-political contexts.
Aim: In this paper we describe and compare the legal framework and the self-regulatory practices of
Cannabis Social Clubs in three countries (Spain, Belgium, and Uruguay). The objective of our comparative
analysis is to investigate how CSCs operate in each of these countries. To foster discussions about how one
might regulate CSCs to promote public health objectives, we conclude this paper with a discussion on the
balance between adequate governmental control and self-regulatory competences of CSCs.
Methods: The data used for this analysis stem from independently conducted local studies by the authors
in their countries. Although the particular designs of the studies differ, the data in all three countries was
collected through similar data collection methods: analysis of (legal and other documents), field visits to
the clubs, interviews with staff members, media content analysis.
Findings: We identified a number of similarities and differences among the CSCs’ practices in the three
countries. Formal registration as non-profit association seems to be a common standard among CSCs. We
found nevertheless great variation in terms of the size of these organisations. Generally, only adult
nationals and/or residents are able to join the CSCs, upon the payment of a membership fee. While
production seems to be guided by consumption estimates of the members (Spain and Belgium) or by the
legal framework (Uruguay), the thresholds applied by the clubs vary significantly across countries.
Quality control practices remain an issue in the three settings studied here. The CSCs have developed
different arrangements with regards to the distribution of cannabis to their members.
Conclusions: By uncovering the current practices of CSCs in three key settings, this paper contributes to
the understanding of the model, which has to some extent been shaped by the self-regulatory efforts of
those involved on the ground. We suggest that some of these self-regulatory practices could be
accommodated in future regulation in this area, while other aspects of the functioning of the CSCs may
require more formal regulation and monitoring. Decisions on this model should also take into account the
local context where the clubs have emerged. Finally, the integration of medical supply within this model
warrants further attention.
© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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While the debate on cannabis policy has often been polarised
around either total prohibition or legalisation, such positions tend
to draw on an oversimplification of what ‘legalisation’ and* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: tom.decorte@ugent.be (T. Decorte).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2016.12.020
0955-3959/© 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.‘prohibition’ entails and do not capture well the range of options
available (Caulkins et al., 2015a, 2015b; MacCoun, Reuter, &
Schelling, 1996; MacCoun & Reuter, 2011; Transform, 2013).
Caulkins et al. (2015a) identified and compared twelve broad
supply models, which could be alternatives to the current
prohibition regime. They referred to a range of middle ground
options, including ‘locally controlled retail sales’ in line with the
so-called Dutch coffee-shop model, which relies on non-enforce-
ment against retail selling and possession (drawing on a
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MacCoun, 2013; MacCoun and Reuter, 2001, 2011; Room, Fischer,
Hall, Lenton, & Reuter, 2010). Domestic cultivation or a ‘grow your
own’ model which allows users to cultivate their own cannabis has
also been formally introduced or tolerated in several jurisdictions
(MacCoun, 2013; MacCoun and Reuter, 2011). The introduction of a
government monopoly with direct control of the supply of
cannabis or the allocation of that role to a public authority are
other possible avenues – with a view to reduce the involvement of
for-profit firms in the market. Other middle ground options may be
based on a license-system, granted for instance to a restricted
number of for profit-firms.
The focus of this paper is on yet another possible middle ground
option: the Cannabis Social Clubs. A Cannabis Social Club (CSC)1 is a
legally constituted non-profit association of cannabis consumers.
Cannabis Social Clubs collectively cultivate cannabis plants for
their adult members, to meet their personal needs (Barriuso, 2005,
2011; Room et al., 2010). According to the ‘Code of Conduct’ of the
European Coalition for Just and Effective Drug Policies (ENCOD,
2011), Cannabis Social Clubs are a model initiated by cannabis
users, “to prevent cannabis consumers from being involved in
illegal activities and assures that certain requirements concerning
public health and safety are being fulfilled. Cannabis Social Clubs
(CSC) are registered, non-profit associations that are formed by
adult people who consume cannabis. They can be set up legally in
any country where cultivation of personal amounts of cannabis has
been decriminalised. In countries where this is not yet the case,
CSC’s can operate as an experiment in order to prepare for the
moment when the laws on cannabis cultivation for personal use
will change”. The definition proposed by ENCOD underlines that
transparency, democracy and non-profitability are essential
characteristics of the model, and points at its potential for harm
reduction:“Cannabis Social Clubs apply an active policy of
prevention of harms and risks and promotion of safer methods
of consumption of cannabis by its members” (see also: Belackova,
Tomkova & Zabransky, 2016).
Although CSCs can be found in many countries, the label often
covers very different empirical realities. In fact, they have emerged
as part of bottom-up (grassroots) initiatives (in Spain and Belgium,
and several European countries), but they have also been part of
top-bottom policies (as in Uruguay). Uruguay has adopted a legal
framework for CSCs since December 2013. In the absence of a clear
legal framework in European countries (such as Belgium and
Spain), these organisations continue to operate at best in a grey
zone (as discussed below). Many of such clubs chose to self-
regulate and adhere to the five main principles as laid out in the
above mentioned ‘Code of Conduct’: supply should follow demand,
the CSCs should be non-profit, transparent, health-oriented and
open to dialogue with authorities. However, other CSCs have
adopted practices that diverge from those principles (Bewley-
Taylor, Blickman & Jelsma, 2014; Decorte, 2015).
Any discussion of possible regulatory approaches starts with a
clarification of the main objectives of regulation. In this paper we
explicitly adopt a public health perspective: we assume that the
debate about whether and how Cannabis Social Clubs should be
regulated, should primarily seek to fulfil public health objectives:
minimizing access, availability, and use by youths; minimizing
drugged driving; minimizing dependence and addiction; mini-
mizing consumption of cannabis products with unwanted con-
taminants and uncertain potency, and minimizing concurrent use
of cannabis and alcohol, particularly in public settings (Pacula,
Kilmer, Wagenaar, Chaloupka, & Caulkins, 2014). Our starting point1 The terms ‘club’, ‘organisation’ or ‘association’ are used interchangeably to refer
to Cannabis Social Clubs throughout the paper.is that any regulatory approach of CSCs should help to ensure their
transparent and safe way of working, and to constitute a healthier
alternative for the black market, enabling CSCs to apply an active
policy of prevention of harms and risks and promotion of safer
methods of consumption of cannabis by its members (Ritter, 2010).
In this paper we aim to describe and compare the legal
frameworks and (self-) regulatory practices of CSCs in Spain,
Belgium and Uruguay (see also: Pardo, 2014). We use the
normative definition put forward by the cannabis movement (in
this case, ENCOD) as a starting point. Aspects included in our
comparative analysis are the domestic legal framework, the
establishment procedures or practices, the characteristics of the
formal organisation and management of the clubs, and their
cannabis cultivation and distribution procedures. The objective of
our comparative analysis is to investigate how CSCs operate in each
of these countries, taking into account both the legal framework
and the self-regulatory practices. To foster discussions about how
one might regulate CSCs from a public health perspective, we
conclude this paper with a discussion on the balance between
adequate governmental control and self-regulatory competences
of CSCs.
Spanish cannabis activists established the first cannabis
associations in the early nineties,2 and in the first decade of the
21st century the number of Cannabis Social Clubs increased in a
linear fashion, with the model spreading throughout Spain (Parés
& Bouso, 2015). While no official source has, to our knowledge,
information on the exact amount of operating CSCs in Spain, based
on previous estimates (e.g., Muñoz Sánchez, 2015), informal
sources and expert interviews we estimate that there may be
between 800 and 1.000 CSCs currently open and distributing
cannabis and other cannabis derivatives (January 2016).3 Catalonia
and the Basque Country are the autonomous regions where CSC
presence is more extended. The Spanish model soon began being
introduced by activists in other European countries, in particular
Belgium, but also in the United Kingdom, and even in France
(Bewley-Taylor et al., 2014) – although little is known about the
functioning of CSCs in the two latter countries. In Belgium, a first
mapping by Decorte (2015) pointed to the existence of five CSCs
active as of February 2014. While some of those clubs have
meanwhile ceased their activities, new CSCs have emerged. An
ongoing study by Pardal (forthcoming) has, at the time of writing,
identified seven active CSCs. In Uruguay Cannabis Social Clubs are
now allowed under the new cannabis law approved in December
2013 (Montañés, 2014). In Uruguay, at November 2016, there are
27 CSCs that fully comply with the regulations and therefore are
completely legal. Other clubs are currently undergoing the process
of formalisation before the governmental cannabis regulation
body, i.e. the Institute for the Regulation and Control of Cannabis
(hereinafter IRCCA). There might also be other clubs operating by-
passing the regulation entirely, but it is virtually impossible to
determine their number.
The data used for this analysis stem from independently
conducted local studies by the authors in their respective
countries, with different research designs. Therefore, data were
not collected through identical data collection methods. The data
on the Spanish CSCs (collected by co-authors Sanchez and
Pares) are based on an analysis of the multiple regulatory
proposals recently developed in Spain, a review of the literature,
interviews with relevant political and social representatives,2 The first known association of this type was ARSEC (“Asociacion Ramon Santos
de Estudios del Cannabis”) which was established in 1991, adopting the designation
of ‘association for the study of cannabis” (Marín, 2008).
3 In addition, we have also consulted the national registry of legal associations
and identified nearly 1000 registered CSCs so this estimate seems plausible.
5 The possession of cannabis in prison, in youth protection institutes, in
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evolution – conducted since January 2014. Beyond regular
conversations in the context of that monitoring fieldwork, the
authors conducted 10 face-to-face semi-structured interviews
with directors of CSCs in Catalonia between March to December
2015. The data on the Belgian CSCs (collected by co-authors
Decorte and Pardal) are based on an exploratory study conducted
by Decorte circa 2014 (Decorte, 2015), based on a review of the
international literature, of the internal documentation and media
reports on the Belgian CSCs, as well as on face-to-face interviews
with the directors of the five CSCs operating at the time, and field
visits to those clubs (see also Decorte, 2015). These data have been
complemented with additional desk research in the context of an
ongoing study by Pardal (forthcoming). The data on the
Uruguayan CSCs (collected by co-authors Boidi and Queirolo)
are based on a series of eight interviews (seven of them face-to-
face and one by phone) with CSCs members and authorities and on
documentary research (see also Queirolo, Boidi & Cruz, 2016). Data
were collected from March to August 2015. Despite CSCs being
legal in Uruguay, there is no public directory that allows one to
directly reach them. In order to gain access to as many clubs as
possible, the Uruguayan team followed different strategies:
personal networks, existing bonds with pro-cannabis regulation
activists, references from other clubs, and previous contacts with
frequent cannabis consumers that were made during a previous
study (Boidi, Queirolo & Cruz, 2015). A standardised questionnaire
was used in the interviews, based on the instrument developed by
Decorte (2015).
The domestic legal framework for CSCs: the case of Spain,
Belgium and Uruguay
In order to better understand some of the characteristics the
clubs have adopted in these three different countries, which we
turn to in Section: The CSC model, it is important to consider the
specific the legal context in which they have emerged and
developed to date. In Spain there is no nation-wide regulation
applicable to the activities of the CSCs. Nevertheless, the Spanish
drug regulatory framework has several peculiarities that have
allowed the emergence and development of the CSC model in the
country (Marín, 2008) (although jurisprudence has recently
pointed in a different direction). The CSCs have based their
activities on two legal arguments: (1) that personal and private
drug use has no criminal relevance within the Spanish legal
system, and (2) the so-called ‘shared consumption doctrine’
developed by the Supreme Court (Barriuso, 2011; Díez & Muñoz,
2012; García and Manjón-Cabeza, 2009; Manzanera et al., 2000).
The use and possession of cannabis (as with the rest of controlled
substances) is not punishable under Spanish criminal law (in the
case of possession, as long as it is intended for personal
consumption).4 It is the commercialisation of those substances
that effectively constitutes a criminal offence, according to article
368 of the Spanish Criminal Code. The CSCs thus have built on
these premises to produce cannabis that is distributed on a non-
profit basis among a closed circuit of adult users. While a number
of autonomous regions and municipalities have sought to
introduce guidelines or local regulation of certain aspects of the
activities of these organisation, no legislative change has been
introduced at the national level (Parlamento de Navarra, 2014;
Parlamento Vasco, 2014; X, 2015; Generalitat de Catalunya
Departament de Salut, 2015; Reyero & Carra, 2014).4 Under the Organic Law 4/2015 on the Protection of Public Security, drug use and
possession in public places, are punishable with fines that might range from 600 to
30.000s, even if not intended for traffic.The CSC model has also not been object of regulation to date in
Belgium (Decorte et al., 2013). In fact, there is some uncertainty as
to the legality of the activities of the clubs operating in the country,
as these have been exploring the flexibility and ambiguity within
the domestic drugs legislation (Decorte et al., 2014; Gelders &
Vander Laenen, 2007; Kilmer, Kruithof, Pardal, Caulkins, & Rubin,
2013; Pardal, 2016). In Belgium, the possession, cultivation and
trade of cannabis is prohibited (1921 Law on Narcotic Drugs).
Nevertheless, a 2005 Ministerial Guideline attributed the lowest
priority for prosecution to the possession of cannabis under
specific circumstances. Accordingly, an ‘user amount’ of up to 3 g or
one cannabis plant may be tolerated (i.e., receive the lowest
priority for prosecution), where this possession does not result in
disturbance to the public order and in the absence of aggravating
circumstances.5 The Belgian CSCs have argued that they are
operating within the limits established by that Ministerial
Guideline by cultivating one plant per member and that therefore
their activities should receive the lowest priority for prosecution.
However, the application of the Ministerial Guideline to the clubs’
collective cultivation remains disputed.
Cannabis clubs are legal and completely regulated by the
government in Uruguay. They are one of the three ways in which
the Cannabis Law (Law 19,172) regulating the production,
distribution and consumption of cannabis allows nationals who
are at least 18 years old to obtain cannabis. The CSCs need to go
through a series of steps to be granted authorisation to operate by
the Institute for the Regulation and Control of Cannabis (IRCCA),
which is the government institution overseeing all (legal) cannabis
operations in the country. The clubs must first constitute a non-
profit organisation (stating as its sole purpose the cultivation and
distribution of cannabis among its members), and complete the
mandatory registry with the Registry Office at the Ministry of
Education and Culture (i.e., the government body that keeps record
of non-profits of all sorts). Once the Ministry of Education approves
the registry, the clubs must register with IRCCA (2014), which will
ultimately approve the club opening after inspecting their
premises and crop plan. In comparison with the other two cases
under study in this article, only Uruguayan CSCs follow such an
authorisation procedure.
The CSC model: self-regulatory practices in Spain and Belgium,
and legislative requirements in Uruguay
In the following sections we describe the known practices of
CSCs in Spain, Belgium and Uruguay. We address both the supply
cycle of the clubs, from the recruitment of growers to the
distribution of cannabis to the members, as well as the internal
structure, organisation, and house-rules of the CSCs in the three
contexts.
The establishment of a CSC
Spain
The path of creation and development of a CSC generally follows
a set of steps. It begins with the CSC foundation and recording in
the national/regional registry of associations, a requirement that
any other association must fulfil (minimum 3 people involved). The
CSCs formally adopt a non-profit status, and the clubs’ bylawseducational centres and surrounding area, or the blatant possession of cannabis in a
public space are examples of situations that are understood to disturb the public
order (Decorte, 2015; EMCDDA, 2015; Kilmer et al., 2013). The possession of
cannabis in the presence of minors, the involvement of a criminal organisation or
causing harm/death to another individual constitute aggravating circumstances
(Decorte, 2015; EMCDDA, 2015; Kilmer et al., 2013).
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cannabis among their members as one of the association’s goals.
The next step is the approval of a collective cultivation agreement
by its members.
As there is no specific formal regulation for CSCs in Spain, as
explained above, there are no nation-wide criteria with regards to
the CSCs locations. With that said, a few city councils (mainly in
Catalonia) have developed municipal ordinances that do regulate
some aspects of the CSC model, including the distance among the
various clubs, as well as between CSCs and education and health
facilities. The criteria used by the different municipal ordinances
are not homogeneous, and the distances requested differ: for
instance, from 1 km to 100 m, in the case of the distance imposed
between CSCs.
Talking about a “Spanish CSC model” is thorny. In a context of
legal uncertainty and in the absence of a specific and comprehen-
sive regulation, multiple versions of the model have emerged and
coexist. Reliable data and empirical studies on this/these realities
are also missing. Over the years, several CSC leaders and activists
have formed CSC federations, and developed good practice codes
and self-regulation initiatives (Arana, 2013; CATFAC, 2014;
FEDCAC, 2013). There are at least 12 regional CSCs’ federations
in Spain. It is difficult to estimate the proportion of active CSCs that
are federated, but those seem to be a minority. The autonomous
region most known by the authors, Catalonia, has two CSC
federations which gather around 25 CSCs each – this while the
estimated total number of clubs in that region is at about 400.
Some of the guidelines issued by the CSC federations, including
those of Federació d’Associacions de Cànnabis de Catalunya, the
Basque Institute of Criminology and Federació d’Associacions
Cannàbiques Autoregulades de Catalunya (Arana, 2013; FEDCAC,
2013; CATFAC, 2014) address aspects such as the maximum total
number of members per club (e.g., according to the most restrictive
guidelines that would correspond to 650 members), the maximum
quantity of cannabis distributed monthly to each member (e.g.,
between 60 and 90 g, approximately), including a residence
criterion for membership of the clubs (e.g., in some cases,
members must be current residents in the city where the clubs
are based; in others, membership is open to residents of the
Schengen area,6 with a waiting period of two weeks, in order to
avoid tourists), and defining protocols for cannabis transportation,
and security. Despite those efforts, the lack of regulation has also
fostered opportunism and excess, such as CSC promotion among
tourists, the sale of cannabis beyond the typical CSC practices, or
the neglect of good relations with the community. Disputes among
CSC leaders about some of those practices have sometimes
occurred too.
Belgium
In Belgium, CSCs have tended to register as non-profit
associations in the national registry of associations. While this is
of course not a mandatory requirement, all the five CSCs identified
by Decorte (2015) had been formalised as such. Ongoing research
by Pardal (forthcoming) has confirmed this tendency also with the
more recent CSCs. The clubs are generally founded by at least three
individuals who constitute the ‘board of directors’ of the club (e.g.,
President, treasurer, secretary). In their bylaws, the CSCs generally
make explicit reference to the goals and key activities of the6 The Schengen Area is the area composed of 26 European states that have
officially abolished passport and any other type of border control at their mutual
borders. The area mostly functions as a single country for international travel
purposes with a common visa policy. The area is named after the Schengen
Agreement. States in the Schengen Area have eliminated border controls with the
other Schengen members and strengthened border controls with non-Schengen
countries.association, including the cultivation and distribution of cannabis
among their members.
No particular formal rules with regards to the location of the
CSCs are applied in the Belgian context. While circa February
2014 most clubs reported officially renting buildings or parts of
buildings for the official seat of the organisations (Decorte, 2015),
at the time of writing, we encounter a different picture. We found
that all but one CSC has its own separate premises Pardal
(forthcoming). The remaining clubs operate from the personal
address of one of the directors, or rent a location for specific
gatherings and activities of the clubs (e.g., internal meetings,
cannabis distribution moments).
In the absence of legislation or regulation specifically applicable
to the CSC model (see Section The domestic legal framework for
CSCs), the development of working practices and rules has mainly
been shaped by those involved in the management of the CSCs
(Pardal, 2016). To date, no federation of CSCs has been created in
Belgium, but there have been plans to do so in the future (Decorte,
2015). Most Belgian CSCs are also members of ENCOD.
Uruguay
Uruguayan regulation requires each CSC to first register as a non-
profit organisation, for which it needs to comply with an extensive
list of legal requirements. For instance, the club needs to select a
name which must include the expression ‘cannabis club’ in it, and it
must also provide a valid address. The non-profit organisation must
be established by a foundational assembly constituted by at least 15
(and no more than 45) members. That assembly appoints the
management structure of the CSC: the Board and the Auditing
Committee. All the proceedings from the foundational assembly
must be registered in the club’s official record books and certified by
a public notary. The notary certification, together with the club’s
original record books and proof of address must be submitted to the
Registry Office at the Ministry of Education.
Only once the Registry Office approves the application and
grants the club the status of legally registered non-profit, the CSC
can apply for registration before the IRCCA. The registry with IRCCA
does not actually take place at IRCCA offices, but rather it begins at
the Uruguayan Postal Service, where the CSC authorities must
submit all the documentation and certification granted by the
Ministry of Education, together with their ‘Crop Plan’ describing
the technical and safety features of the plantation, as well as a
description of the club premises and security measures. Due to
their widespread presence throughout the territory, the Postal
Services offices were chosen by the government as the go to spot
for cannabis registration: cannabis growers must also register
there. The Postal Office serves only as a more accessible entry point
for the registry, but it is actually IRCCA who will receive and
analyse the submitted application, and grant the authorisation to
operate upon inspection of the club premises.
Cannabis clubs are just becoming official, with only two of them
having received complete approval to date (March 2016). By law, a
federation must be constituted by several organisations (at least 3).
Since most Uruguayan CSCs have not completed the process of
becoming formal organisations, therefore they cannot form a
federation (yet). However, there is a cooperative spirit among
those involved, and members of some cannabis clubs are grouped
under the Federation of Cannabis Growers. This federation reunites
self-growers, members of CSCs and representatives of NGO’s
working in risk reduction. The federation representatives are in
touch with government officials and they claim to inform the
cannabis policy implementation process (X, 2014). The operation
of the clubs is heavily regulated by law, leaving little space for self-
regulatory practices. For instance, CSCs cannot be located within
150 m of education or addiction treatment centres, and they must
be at least 1.000 m away from other cannabis clubs’ headquarters.
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Spain
Generally, the clubs have adopted several membership require-
ments: the candidate members need to complete and sign a
membership form; they are also asked to declare being over
18 years old (and in some cases, over 21), and being a regular
cannabis user. The application must be supported by a person who
is already a member of that association. There is no actual
restriction to becoming a member of more than one CSC. Most of
these members use cannabis for recreational purposes.
Medical cannabis users have also sought to join CSCs. While
there is no specific requirement for one to enrol as a medical user of
a CSC (for instance, no special accreditation from a doctor is
requested), it is common that medical users present a medical
certificate including their clinical history or showing that they
suffer from one of the pathologies recognised by the International
Association for Cannabinoid Medicines (IACM). It is also a common
practice for CSCs to grant the medical members a discount on the
cannabis price or to allow them to receive larger amounts of
cannabis than recreational users (if necessary). To our knowledge,
there are very few clubs who admit only medical cannabis users.
Generally, Spanish law does not impose any limit of members to
associations in Spain. This helps explain why nowadays there are
CSCs in the country with more than several thousand members
(Mumbrú, 2015). As mentioned above, some of the good practice
codes recommend a maximum number of 650 members (Arana,
2013; FEDCAC, 2013; CATFAC, 2014).
In general, CSCs do not admit non-residents, although it is well
known that some of them (e.g. in Barcelona) advertise among
tourists (ABC, 2014). There is usually an annual fee that ranges
between 10–30 euros, although some clubs do not charge any fee.
Most CSCs allow their members to consume inside the premises
of the clubs. While it seems that the CSCs may have adopted
different practices with regards to opening hours, or the
consumption of alcohol within the clubs’ premises, more research
is needed to shed light into these aspects.
Advertisement or promotion of cannabis consumption is
explicitly prohibited by the Spanish Criminal Code. Most CSCs
do not have a dedicated website, and in the cases where they do,
the contents of such webpages tend to be limited to information
about the name, location and contact details of the club. Some of
the CSCs use social networks like Facebook or Twitter for activism
purposes, sharing information about the detention of staff
members, trials, or about policy developments. In some cases,
the clubs keep only internal communication with their members,
for instance through an internal mailing list or newsletter, using
WhatsApp groups, or through closed groups on Facebook. Other
clubs do not maintain such (online) lines of communication with
their members.
Belgium
Membership of a CSC in Belgium is open to adult users (at least
18 years old) of cannabis (recreational and/or medical) residing in
Belgium Pardal (forthcoming). Some Belgian CSCs have limited
membership to users who are at least 21 years old (Decorte, 2015).
The admission process includes the completion of a membership
form, where candidate members are asked to confirm that they are
cannabis users (prior to joining the CSC), and declare that they are
aware of the applicable drugs legislation in Belgium and that they
are voluntarily applying to join the CSC (Decorte, 2015). The
candidate members are also invited for an intake interview, where
a representative(s) of the board of direction provides information
about the functioning of the club, and discusses the patterns of
cannabis use of the candidate members. CSC membership is only
possible for one club at a time – although the Belgian CSCsacknowledge that this exclusivity criterion is difficult to imple-
ment in practice Pardal (forthcoming). New members are informed
that the sale of all or part of the cannabis received through the club
to non-members would violate the club regulations, and would
thus lead to the exclusion from the CSC.
All the Belgian CSCs admit medical users of cannabis as well
(Decorte, 2015). In 2015, two new clubs were established in
Belgium that focus exclusively on the supply of cannabis for
medical users (Pardal, forthcoming). Specific requirements as to
the membership of medical users vary among clubs. In some cases,
the clubs request a medical prescription and/or a medical file
which support the use of cannabis in the treatment of a specific
medical condition. During the intake interview, these issues are
also discussed. One of the larger clubs organises a separate intake
interview for candidate members who use cannabis for medical
reasons. Some clubs (including one of the new medical CSCs)
organises also regular follow up sessions with their medical users
(Pardal, forthcoming).
The CSCs tend to define a minimum of three members, but no
maximum limit has been established so far. The actual number of
members varies per club, with smaller clubs gathering over
10 members, and the largest one counting with 237 members
(circa February 2014) (Decorte, 2015). Most clubs tend to have a
waiting list of candidate members, and thus these CSCs are likely to
increase size.
Circa February 2014, the active CSCs in Belgium requested an
annual membership fee of 25s (Decorte, 2015). CSCs members
who also contributed to the cultivation process were in some cases
granted a reduction of their membership fee. Only members and
accompanying adults are allowed to enter the premises of the CSCs.
According to Belgian law, providing a location for the
consumption of prohibited substances constitutes a punishable
offence, and thus it is perhaps unsurprising that the official policy
of most CSCs does not allow for the consumption of cannabis inside
the premises of the clubs. It should be noted though that there may
be differences between smaller and larger clubs, in that the former
may allow for the shared consumption of cannabis at a members’
private house for instance (Decorte, 2015). It is not clear whether
such practices are presently taking place.
Typically, the Belgian CSCs have websites where the purpose of
the organisation is outlined, including references to the cultivation
and distribution of cannabis, and other information (e.g.,
membership form, CSC by-laws, etc.) is publicly made available
(Decorte, 2015). The clubs also keep communication with their
members through social network platforms (such as Facebook) and
through mailing lists.
Uruguay
The Uruguayan cannabis law is very restrictive in terms of
access to the substance. Membership of CSCs in Uruguay is open to
nationals with 18 years or more, and all users must be registered
with IRCCA in order to legally obtain cannabis. There are three
ways of acquiring cannabis: self-grown, through CSCs and by
purchase in pharmacies. These three ways of access are mutually
exclusive: individuals registered as self-growers cannot become
members of CSCs nor become registered for purchasing at
pharmacies. Likewise, individuals cannot belong to more than
one CSC at a time. The IRCCA keeps record of all registered users in
order to prevent individuals from registering under more than one
form of access or in more than once CSC. The main objective of this
feature of the cannabis policy is to cap consumption of cannabis,
currently set at a maximum of 40 g per individual per month.
Admission processes are not well defined, but trust and
recommendations are the two main criteria mentioned for the
admission of new members. In most CSCs, a candidate member
must be introduced by an existing member. As a result, CSC
T. Decorte et al. / International Journal of Drug Policy 43 (2017) 44–56 49membership in Uruguay is essentially composed by friends or
relatives.
Some clubs have medical members, but these are just a few
individuals in only a couple of clubs. The regulation of the cannabis
market was mainly devised for recreational cannabis, and it is only
recently that the protocols for medical cannabis have started being
developed. To our knowledge, there are no clubs specialised in
medical cannabis, although some of them cultivate strains and
(illegally) produce by-products (such as tinctures) for medical
purposes.
The law establishes a minimum (n = 15) and a maximum
(n = 45) number of club members, as well as a maximum of
flowered plants allowed in the club premises at any given time (i.e.,
99 plants). The regulation also establishes a maximum amount of
cannabis per club member (480 g per member/year) and the
mandatory disposition of any remaining produce.
Fees vary significantly depending on the club, from 26 to 92 US
dollars monthly, a price that guarantees access to 40 g of cannabis
per month (prices in August 2015). In several clubs fees are fixed
and mandatory, but in others members pay differential fees
depending on the amount of cannabis they receive. In some clubs
fees can be reduced based on members workload for the club.
Consumption is allowed in CSCs facilities, and interviewees
declare that while that is a frequent practice, the clubs do not really
have a policy or rules guiding the consumption in the premises of
the CSC. Consumption in the CSCs happens mostly when Clubs
organise parties and meetings to test the product; when that is not
the case, most consumers choose to take the product home. Club
representatives were unable to reliably estimate the number of
members who consume in the premises nor the frequency with
which they do it. However, the general impression they convey is
that the Uruguayan CSCs are primarily sought for obtaining
cannabis, and the possibility of consuming it in the premises is not
one of the most valued features of the clubs. There are no clear
rules about consumption of other substances in the premises of the
clubs, but it is clear from the interviews that consumption of
alcohol is allowed, at least during parties.
The clubs’ activities are promoted among members by email,
Facebook or the free instant messaging application WhatsApp,
which is very popular in Uruguay. By regulation, advertising of club
activities to non-members is not allowed. It is also prohibited to
advertise or promote the activities of the club on facades or in any
other public spaces. None of the clubs surveyed owns a website,
but two of them have Facebook accounts. Of those, only one is a
public Facebook profile and it is not devoted to the specific
activities of the club but rather to raise awareness about cannabis
consumption in general and the Uruguayan regulation in particu-
lar.
Management of a CSC
Spain
By law, Spanish associations should have a democratic,
horizontal management structure, according to which all the
important decisions are to be taken at general assembly meetings.
The associations should also organise at least one general
assembly meeting per year. While these practices were followed
by the first CSCs (constituted until 2010), since then new actors
have emerged and those criteria have had a more relaxed
interpretation. Nowadays, there is thus a wide range of views
with regards to the management of CSCs. For instance, it is quite
common that the CSCs are managed by a small group of people,
and that the annual general assembly is not really the place where
important decisions are discussed. In those cases, the group of
CSC managers tend to be the one who initially (financially)
invested in the set up of the CSC.Most clubs hire paid staff who work on the various activities of
the clubs, ranging from cultivation, transportation and distribution
tasks, to the day-to-day maintenance of the CSCs (e.g., cleaning,
security and entrance control). Approximately, a CSC with
700 members tends to employ 10 staff members.
While all CSCs are registered as non-profit associations in the
official registry of associations, there have been several cases of
malpractices and lack of transparency regarding the real make of
profit, especially during the period of expansion of the model.
This has been the root of some tension between the representa-
tives of clubs that try to work on a non-profit basis, and employ a
more horizontal decision-making structure, and the representa-
tives of other clubs which do not necessarily adhere to such
practices. Again, while some CSCs follow the good practice codes
promoted by the federations of CSCs (FEDCAC, 2013; Arana, 2013;
CATFAC, 2014), most apply their own rules.
Belgium
While the administration of the Belgian CSCs has been
described as democratic, the extent to which members participate
in the decision-making process of these clubs may vary across
clubs. Formally, all clubs appoint a board of directors, which should
report to the general assembly of members at least once a year. In
previous research we have found that smaller clubs tended to
concentrate the administrative, organisational and financial
management work on a few founding members, while the largest
and oldest club was able to allocate certain tasks to specific
working groups within the club (Decorte, 2015).
The CSCs have in most cases relied on the assistance of
volunteer members, and generally do not hire paid staff to assist
with administrative tasks and/or the cultivation process, with
exception of the larger club which has contracted staff. The
growers, as described in Section Cannabis cultivation within a CSC
are usually compensated for their labour by the CSCs.
The clubs have reported operating on a non-profit basis, in
accordance to the by-laws of the organisations, with any financial
gains being reinvested in the clubs to support the organisation’s
activities (e.g., lobbying efforts, social activities, medical and legal
consultancy fees, etc.) (Decorte, 2015). To date, there has been one
known case of a CSC which arguably misused its non-profit status
(Flemish newspaper Het Laatste Nieuws, 11 December 2015).
Nevertheless, some of the CSCs have voiced concern about the
possible emergence of ‘shadow clubs’ oriented by other (for-profit)
principles (Pardal, forthcoming; Decorte, 2015).
Uruguay
According to the law, Uruguayan CSCs must have a board of
directors that executes the guidelines provided by the general
assembly of members, which must reunite with certain periodicity.
In reality, the general assembly of members rarely meets (with the
exception of the first foundational assembly where the protocol is
signed), and there are only a few club members involved in the
club’s daily activities. These highly involved members might or
might not be part of the board of directors. The majority of the
members only gather to collect their share of cannabis when it is
available. This is a case of strict regulation that has not (yet) been
met by equally strict control and enforcement – it does not
however represent a major challenge for policy implementation.
The bigger issue at stake here is diminished participation which
posits burdens that are practical – not legal – to the clubs daily
operation.
Most clubs surveyed do not have paid personnel, and therefore
the workload is shared among the most committed members
(which in some cases are waived their membership fees in
exchange for their service). Exceptionally, clubs may call all
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period. The clubs that have paid personnel count with a gardener
and an administrative staffer. In those cases, they are the ones
responsible for the CSC daily functioning. The general assembly
of members is called when a major change must be discussed (e.g.,
moving the club premises) or once a year for the mandatory
accountability meeting.
By definition, Uruguayan CSCs are non-profit organisations, as
they are constituted as civic associations, not as business entities.
None of the club representatives we interviewed expressed
intention to make profit from the clubs’ activities.
Cannabis cultivation within a CSC
Spain
The CSC rents or buys everything needed for growing and
harvest, including land, buildings and equipment. The quantity
that should be cultivated is estimated with basis on the predicted
amount consumed by each member per month. In Spain, when a
new member joins a CSC, he/she has to indicate a quantity of
cannabis that he/she normally consumes during one month. The
total amount of plants harvested is calculated with basis on these
individual estimates in order to provide sufficient cannabis to the
members. As some CSC have more than 5.000 members, it is
perhaps unsurprising that some CSCs may have vast plantations
sites, with more than 1.000 plants.
The majority of the CSCs grow the cannabis in hidden venues,
with high security controls. While some of the CSCs’ growers are
members of the club, others are formally hired as gardeners
(which is the official legal figure). However, in practice there may
be some flexibility in terms of the formalities with growers. The
crops and the transport of the cannabis remain an aspect of CSCs’
work which is the most vulnerable to police intervention. It
should be noted that not all the CSCs grow their own cannabis at
all times, as the CSCs base their activities on the ‘shared
consumption doctrine’ (discussed in Section The domestic legal
framework for CSCs) which leaves the users unpunished under
certain circumstances, regardless of the way the substance
(cannabis, in this case) is obtained. In some cases the clubs
buy the cannabis in the black market. Those CSCs and their
lawyers have claimed that such practice does not constitute a
legal offence as no profit is generated from the initial purchase
and distribution of cannabis among the associate members. More
information about the number of clubs engaging in such practice
is not available.
Every CSC has its own chart of cannabis products, with dozens
of strains, many types of cannabis derivatives, extractions, edibles,
etc. The CSC main product remains herbal cannabis, either from
indoor or outdoor cultivation. However, in some cases the clubs
also produce cannabis resin (mainly hashish, but also other resins –
extractions with butane gas and/or other dissolvent, reportedly
containing a THC concentration of 80 or 90%). The clubs
increasingly prepare other cannabis products such as alcohols,
creams, oils, tinctures or sweets, fostering alternative methods of
use. Most clubs offer vaporizers as well.
Regarding the quality control processes of the clubs, a few CSCs
test their cannabis in specialised labs, but the majority of them do
not (see also: Belackova et al., 2016). The CSCs analysing their
products usually test the percentage of cannabinoids, the presence
of additives and contaminants, as well as other microbiological
tests.
Belgium
In Belgium, each plant grown by the CSC has an individual
record, a so-called ‘grow card’, indicating its ownership by one of
the members of the club (Decorte, 2015). The cultivation ofcannabis has been organised in different ways by the Belgian CSCs,
with some opting for synchronous production (i.e., growing all the
plants at one time and distributing the harvest among the
members every 3 months for instance) and others cultivating
the cannabis asynchronously, in order to being able to provide
(smaller amounts of) cannabis on a more frequent basis. The
Belgian CSCs report cultivating a number of plants corresponding
to the number of members (i.e., one plant per member), which
relates to the legal framework in which the CSCs operate in
Belgium, as discussed in the Section: The domestic legal
framework for CSCs.
The cultivation of cannabis by the CSCs is generally a task for
which some of the clubs’ members volunteer. The growers are thus
members of the CSCs, and are generally compensated for their
activity as growers. The clubs tend to draft a protocol and/or
contract with their growers, defining for instance the number of
plants to be grown per cultivation site and per m2, the minimum
conditions for each cultivation site (e.g., cultivation site must be a
private and enclosed space, not accessible to third parties or
minor), or the growing process (e.g., organic cultivation, technical
equipment to be checked by the club) (Decorte, 2015; Pardal,
forthcoming). Growers are not allowed to grow cannabis for others,
but may grow one plant for their own personal use.
Circa February 2014, all the CSCs were growing cannabis
indoors, and kept several small cultivation sites (Decorte, 2015).
Key reasons for dispersing production across different sites include
reducing the risk of shortage due to plant disease or theft, and
minimizing potential law enforcement and judicial impacts, as
according to the classification used by the Belgian police,
plantations containing up to 49 plants are seen as ‘micro-
plantations’ or ‘mini-plantations’ (Decorte, 2015). The clubs’
decisions on which strains of cannabis are cultivated are based
on growers’ and members’ preferences.
The Belgian clubs focus on the production of herbal cannabis,
but in some instances (mainly involving medical users) the CSCs
provide also information about how to prepare other cannabis-
based products to their members (e.g., cookies, tea, oil). The CSCs
tend to produce several strains of cannabis. A few of the active
clubs offer also vaporizers at wholesale prices (Decorte, 2015;
Pardal, forthcoming).
The clubs have reported experiencing problems with growers in
several occasions. Thefts, non-adherence to the production
protocol, low quality cannabis, have been some of the issues
mentioned by the CSCs with regards to their relation with growers
(Decorte, 2015). Most clubs use somewhat rudimentary quality
control mechanisms, but would like to introduce more stand-
ardised quality control practices. Generally, a representative from
the CSC visits and inspects the cultivation sites at different points
in time during the growing process (Decorte, 2015).
Uruguay
CSCs are allowed to cultivate up to 99 flowering plants at a time
according to Uruguayan law. This threshold relates to an estimate
of how many plants may be necessary to produce up to 40 g for
each of the 45 members that a club is authorised to have. However,
interviewees from most clubs declared that they have fewer plants
than that. Clubs decide on their cannabis production based on the
number of members: they all target to produce enough cannabis to
supply 40 g per member per month, which is the maximum
amount allowed by law. The regulation also establishes a
mandatory disposition of any remaining produce.
In all the clubs surveyed the gardener is a member of the club. In
some cases this person receives a small salary for the job (but it is
unclear whether the gardener is in fact registered for social
security, following all the official formalities).
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Indoor cultivation is mainly used during winter, and outdoor
during the summer. The clubs prefer to combine both to minimize
the risk of a drought period, a plague or simply a bad harvest. Most
clubs are still quite inexperienced in cannabis cultivation and
therefore their productivity varies a lot: from 50 to 200 g per plant
in indoors facilities, and from 350 g to 3 kg for outdoor cultivation.
The Uruguayan law only allows clubs to produce cannabis, not
derivatives. The clubs decide what to plant either based on their
members’ expressed preferences (for the most sophisticated and
well-organised clubs) or on whatever seeds or strains they have
available (e.g., from the members own self-grown plants, or from
seed banks). Most surveyed clubs report having only a few strains
(between 5–8), while others – again, the well-organised ones –
report having 15 or even more than 20 strains. Two of the clubs
surveyed organise tasting events where members get to try and
evaluate the products. In those cases, the next plantation is decided
based on the members preferences expressed during those tastings
events.
Despite one of the stated advantages of being a CSC member
usually is knowing the characteristics of the consumed cannabis,
there is little knowledge to date about the levels of THC and CBD
among the Uruguayan CSCs. Only a few clubs have sent their plants
to be tested, and members are only aware about the information
that the seed banks provide. Even members that consume cannabis
for medical purposes do not have information about the cannabis
they are using.
Cannabis distribution within a CSC
Spain
Members can generally collect cannabis from the CSCs at any
given moment during the opening hours of the club, without the
need for a prior request or notice.
The CSCs allow the provision of a range between 60 to 90 g per
member, per month. Most of them allow 90 g/month, which
corresponds to 3 g/day for each member. Exceptions for medical
users in need of a higher amount of cannabis may be permitted in
some cases. The CSCs’ members pay a proportionate fee depending
on the quantity they collect at each withdrawal.
The fees are used to cover CSC production costs, storage and
management. Being non-profit organisations, all economic rev-
enues are reinvested in the associations (Barriuso, 2011), although
there actually have been multiple cases of misconduct in which the
clubs have actually generated revenues. The price per gram varies
significantly, from 4,50 to 15 Euros per gram. The extractions are
more expensive, from 15 to 80 Euros per gram.
Only a few clubs, most of which are part of a CSC federation,
provide additional information about the cannabis being distrib-
uted or cannabis use in general.
Belgium
The distribution of cannabis to the CSCs’ members mainly takes
place in bulk, at so-called ‘exchange fairs’. Depending on the
production cycles, CSCs organise exchange fairs every 4–6 weeks
(asynchronous production) or every 2–3 months (synchronous
production) (Decorte, 2015). CSCs supplying medical users have in
some cases adopted different distribution practices, to ensure a
more regular supply and/or facilitate distribution for those users
who are not able to travel to the clubs’ distribution points (Pardal,
forthcoming).
The Belgian CSCs impose different limits with regards to the
quantity of cannabis supplied (varying from 10 g to 30 g per
month). Additionally, some clubs have introduced a different (i.e.,
higher) threshold for their medical members. Members contributeto the production, storage and administrative costs by paying a fee
of 5–8s per gram of cannabis received (Decorte, 2015).
Some of the Belgian CSCs distribute information about the type
of cannabis supplied (genetic composition, physical and mental
effects, description of odour, reviews from members, etc.) as well
as the house-rules (Decorte, 2015). Additionally, information about
sensible use of cannabis and treatment centres are provided by
some of the clubs.
Uruguay
The law establishes a maximum amount of cannabis per club
member (480 g per member/year). Under the Uruguayan model,
clubs do not charge members per gram of cannabis; they charge a
fixed monthly membership fee which grants individuals access to
up to 40 g of cannabis per month. Among the clubs surveyed for
this study, only one does not collect monthly fees but charges
members per gram, at a price of around USD2 per gram of cannabis
(for a maximum of 40 g per month). In other words, no matter how
much you use, you pay the same in the majority of CSCs. This is a
procedure that can certainly motivate more individual consump-
tion, or a grey market by means of buying cooperatives: just one
person is registered as a member but they share/sell their allotted
monthly 40 g with/to other people.
There are three main ways in which CSCs distribute cannabis to
their members. The most common one is to dispense cannabis in
bulk at harvest. In those cases, all the yields from a given harvest
are evenly distributed among the club members. Most clubs are at
early development stages, and therefore they do not produce
enough cannabis to reach the maximum of 480 g per year per user.
To mitigate against this, they distribute all of what they produce
each time. A second form of distribution is the monthly delivery.
The more organised clubs establish a monthly date for distribution,
and club members go to the premises to collect their share. Finally,
one of the surveyed clubs delivers cannabis on demand: each
member can access a maximum of 40 g per month, and pays
according to the quantity received.
To date, clubs have been designed to provide mainly
recreational cannabis. Some medical users complain that this is
an important limitation of the model, especially in what regards
the maximum amount allowed per member/year, which makes it
difficult to develop by-products for medical use.
Some of the clubs surveyed declared their commitment to raise
awareness within society on cannabis consumption and risk
reduction among members. They provide information on respon-
sible consumption and harm reduction strategies.
Discussion
Having described the different practices adopted by the CSCs
operating in Spain, Belgium and Uruguay (Section: The CSC model),
with reference to the legal context in which these have been
developed (Section: The domestic legal framework for CSCs), in
this section we highlight some of the common practices and
emerging issues. While this analysis reveals important aspects
which could inform potential future regulation of the model, a
more comprehensive assessment of the functioning and effects
associated with the model in each country is lacking. Our analysis
is thus limited to the data collection efforts of the three research
teams, and we acknowledge that some CSCs and their practices
may not have been captured. Finally, we are also aware that the
perspectives of CSCs’ members (and growers) were not included in
the country-research on which this analysis was based. Table 1
below provides an overview of our findings in each country, which
we discuss in the following paragraphs.
Table 1
An overview of CSCs’ practices in Spain, Belgium and Uruguay.
Country Spain Belgium Uruguay
Legal status Unregulated Unregulated Regulated
Number Approx. 800–1.000 Approx. 5–10 Approx. 20
Establishment
Formal registration National registry of associations National registry of associations Registry Office at the Ministry of Education
Registry and IRCCA
Official legal form Non-profit association Non-profit association Non-profit association
Number of people
needed to start
3 3 15
Location Different location restrictions in place
across municipalities
No restrictions in place At least 150 m from education and treatment centers
At least 1 km from other CSCs
Federations and self-
regulatory practices
Several federations No federation No federation (but some joined the Federation of
Cannabis Growers)
Good practice codes ENCOD Code of Conduct
ENCOD Code of Conduct
House rules and internal organisation
Membership criteria At least 18 or 21 years old At least 18 or 21 years old At least 18 years old
Sign membership form Sign membership form Registered in IRCCA database as users acquiring
cannabis through a club
Prior regular cannabis users Prior cannabis users Introduced by an existing member
Introduced by an existing member Only Belgian residents Membership of one club only
Only Spanish residents (but in Barcelona
tourists have also joined CSCs)
Awareness of Belgian legislation
Membership of one club only (despite
difficult implementation)
Membership by
medical users
Medical users accepted Medical users accepted Medical users accepted
No specific requirements (but some
members provide medical certificates)
In some cases based on medical prescription
and/or medical file
No specific requirements
New CSCs exclusively for medical users
Minimum/maximum
number of members
No limit applied No limit applied 15–45 members
CSCs up to thousands of members CSCs up to over 200 members
Membership fees Annual fee (with some exceptions) Annual fee Monthly fee
Between 10–30s Approximately 25s 26–92USD (includes up to 40 g of cannabis)
Cannabis
consumption at the
CSC
Yes No Yes
Advertising No No No
Internal communication with members Internal communication with members Internal communication with members
Management of CSCs
Decision-making
structure
Board of directors Board of directors Board of directors
At least annual general assembly
meeting (sometimes pro forma)
At least annual general assembly meeting
(sometimes pro forma)
At least annual general assembly meeting (de facto GA
rarely meets)
Different management styles Different management styles Management mainly by a few members
Paid staff is common CSCs rely mostly on volunteer work from
members
CSCs rely mostly on volunteer work from members
Profit vs. non-profit Non-profit (with exceptions) Non-profit Non-profit
Cannabis cultivation
Planning of production Based on consumption estimate by the
members
One plant per member Up to 99 flowered plants at a time
Each plant receives a ‘grow card’ identifying
ownership
CSC growers Mix of hired growers and members Members of the clubs Members of the clubs
Some clubs buy also from black market
Location and size of
cultivation sites
Indoor and outdoor cultivation Indoor cultivation Indoor and outdoor cultivation
Cultivation sites of different sizes (larger
clubs may have more than 1.000 plants
per site)
Several (small) cultivation sites
Plants cultivated per
club/member
Cultivation corresponding to the sum of
members’ consumption estimates
1 plant per member Max 99 flowered plants per club (at a time)
Types of products/
strains of cannabis
Various cannabis products Mainly herbal cannabis Herbal cannabis only
Various strains Various strains Various strains
Quality control Rarely tested via laboratory methods Rarely tested via laboratory methods Rarely tested via laboratory methods
Growing protocol (contract between CSC
and grower)
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Table 1 (Continued)
Country Spain Belgium Uruguay
Legal status Unregulated Unregulated Regulated
Number Approx. 800–1.000 Approx. 5–10 Approx. 20
“Crop Plan” (including legal requirements regarding
growing methods, phytosanitary management, use of
fertilizers, etc.)
Cannabis distribution
Frequency of
distribution
During opening hours of the club Mainly at exchange fairs (every 2–
3 months), but different practices
within medical clubs
Different modes of distribution: after harvest; monthly
delivery; on demand
No prior notice needed
Quantity limits 60–90 g/per month (approx. 3 g/per day) 10–30 g/per month 40 g/per month (480 g/per year)
Price per gram 4,5–15 s/g 5–8 s/g In most cases, included in membership fee
Additional
information
provided upon
distribution
Some provide information about
responsible consumption and harm
reduction strategies
Some provide information about
responsible consumption and harm
reduction strategies
Some provide information about responsible
consumption and harm reduction strategies
Public profile
Media strategy Both low profile and high profile Both low profile and high profile Both low profile and high profile
(Federated clubs have more public
profile)
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We found, for instance, that CSCs in the three countries have
tended to complete a formal registration as associations in the
relevant domestic registries – both as a result of a legal
requirement (Uruguay) or on their own initiative (Spain, Belgium).
While the clubs have also generally adopted a non-profit status,
recent developments particularly in Spain suggest that formal
controls may be necessary, especially with a view to promote
public health objectives. Pacula et al. (2014) argue that the density
of tobacco outlets is positively associated with smoking rates,
particularly among youths, and that studies have shown a strong
positive relationship between alcohol outlet density and alcohol
misuse. Given the very different number of CSCs present in each
country (see Table 1), it is difficult to conclude as to whether the
number of possible CSCs should be capped by the legislator, and if
so, at which range. Limitations with regards to the location of the
CSCs (for instance, distance to schools and medical centres) as
already included in Uruguayan legislation may be also considered.
House rules and internal organisation of a CSC
With regards to membership criteria, the clubs have to some
extent developed similar practices, for instance admitting only
adult cannabis users. The experience in the three countries
indicates that restricting membership to nationals or residents of
the country may help reducing ‘drug tourism’. The creation of a
centralised database of CSCs and their members (as it is the case in
Uruguay) could be helpful for the application of that criteria, as
well as to ensure that each cannabis user can enrol as member of
only one club. At the same time, we are aware that creating such a
registry may also bring an additional layer of bureaucracy for the
CSCs and their members, and that cannabis users may be reluctant
to complete the registration (for instance, for privacy reasons). The
ongoing experience in Uruguay may provide additional informa-
tion as to the feasibility and further design of this requirement.
The total number of members allowed per CSC is another issue
to be considered in future regulation. It is likely that if clubs enrolthousands of members, they may lose sight of their non-profit
goals and merge into large(r) enterprises, which is to some extent
what has occurred particularly in Barcelona. However, it is also not
clear if the limit currently imposed by the Uruguayan legislation
(i.e., a maximum of 45 members) is practicable.
The CSC model emerged essentially with a focus on recreational
use of cannabis, but in Spain, Belgium and Uruguay medical users
have sought to join CSCs and many clubs have sought to
accommodate their needs. In some cases these medical users
must present a medical certificate or a prescription from a doctor –
but this is not necessarily common practice among most CSCs.
Often the clubs apply other (less stringent) rules related to
minimum age, maximum consumption limits, or they offer
particular strains or cannabis products. In the absence of stringent
quality controls of the cannabis distributed through CSCs to
patients and in the absence of solid collaboration and information
exchange between CSCs and medical specialists, it remains an open
question whether it is a good idea to join medical cannabis and
recreational cannabis under one setting. On the other hand, the
debate about separate and differential regulation of recreational
and medical cannabis clubs may also be complex, especially if one
takes into account the conceptual confusion related to the use of
medicines (i.e., pharmaceutical drugs) and drugs (i.e., illegal
psychoactive substances), the wide range of medical conditions
and symptoms that seem to be instigating medical cannabis use,
and the phenomena of self-declared (but undiagnosed) medical
cannabis use and self-medication practices. Moreover, some
countries may have a regime for cannabis based on medical
prescription that could be in conflict with the (medical) CSC model.
Whether or not the supply of cannabis for medical purposes should
and could take place in specialised CSCs is an important issue for
future research.
CSC members in the three countries contribute to the running of
the organisation with a membership fee. With regards to this
aspect, two different practices have developed: on the one hand,
clubs in Spain and Belgium have opted for an annual membership
that covers the internal costs of managing and maintaining the
CSC; on the other hand, the membership fee in Uruguay is paid on a
54 T. Decorte et al. / International Journal of Drug Policy 43 (2017) 44–56monthly basis and covers also the amount of cannabis that each
member will receive.
Advertisement of the CSCs activities is not allowed nor a
common practice in any of the three contexts studied, a practice
that could be confirmed and further supervised in future
regulatory frameworks.
Cannabis cultivation and distribution within a CSC
Another set of issues which merit attention relate to the
cultivation and distribution of cannabis by the CSCs. The quantity
supplied by the clubs in the three countries seems to be somewhat
related to the consumption estimates made by their members
(although within the quantity limit imposed by law in the case of
Uruguay), which is consistent with the ‘supply-follows-demand’-
philosophy of ENCOD’s Code of Conduct mentioned earlier.
However, as we noted, in practice there might have been deviations
to this principle. Introducing a maximum quantity per member –
the route taken by the Uruguayan legislator, may thus be one
possible way to formalise the ongoing practices of (often
federated) clubs adhering to the ‘Code of Conduct’ for European
CSCs. Determining such a threshold will nevertheless be a difficult
exercise, and could be based on a number of plants or specific
quantity (in grams) per month/year. The Belgian experience which
is based on one plant per member (mainly due to the clubs’
interpretation of prosecution guidelines applicable in that
country) or the limit of 40 g per month set out by the Uruguayan
legislation could be useful starting points for thinking about such
thresholds. Production limits, corresponding to the quantity
thresholds mentioned above may also be introduced. At the
moment, only Uruguay has introduced a concrete limit for
production, which is set at 99 plants (at one given time). In
Belgium, the total number of plants corresponds to the total
number of members (as clubs report cultivating one plant per
member).
Additionally, decisions about the number of cultivation sites
authorised per club and the size of each of those cultivation sites
should also be considered. While the practices in the three
countries have shown that the clubs draft agreements with their
growers (in Belgium) or have to prepare a crop plan (in Uruguay),
the relations between clubs and growers have at times been
troublesome.
CSC members often see high product quality, purity and control
of content among the biggest benefits the CSCs provide (Belackova
et al., 2016). However, we found no unified system of quality
control in place in any of the three countries. The monitoring of
cultivation practices remains a point for attention, even in the case
of Uruguay, where regulation applicable to the model has been
introduced. An important obstacle to implement standardised
toxicological analyses to ensure the quality, potency and purity of
cannabis supplied by the clubs, would be its considerable cost (see
also: Belackova et al., 2016) and the current domestic legal
frameworks.
Our analysis has also uncovered a number of different modes of
distribution of cannabis adopted by the clubs. In some cases, the
cannabis is distributed to the members in bulk, for instance after
harvest (see for instance the ‘exchange fairs’ organised by some
Belgian CSCs, or monthly deliveries by Uruguayan CSCs). In other
instances clubs accept on demand orders, and finally other clubs
have a permanent stock of cannabis and allow members to collect
their desired amount during the opening hours of the club, without
the need for any prior notice (this is the standard practice by
Spanish clubs). Whether and how these modes affect the
consumption levels of the cannabis users members of the clubs
remains to be further assessed.Conclusions
This paper identifies the ways in which the CSC model has
developed in three different contexts, under different domestic
legal frameworks. As discussed throughout, many similarities and
differences in terms of the practices of the CSCs within and across
countries emerged (Pardo, 2014). Understanding these aspects
provides important pointers which could inform potential future
regulation in this field. In our view, such a regulatory framework
will need to strike a balance between sufficiently allowing and
accommodating the self-regulatory efforts of those involved in
the CSC model to date, but at the same time ensuring adequate
governmental control with a view to protecting and promoting
public health goals. As the CSC movement expands, sole reliance
on self-regulatory practices and a non-profit ethos becomes, in
our view, difficult without more formal controls – a lesson learnt
from the Spanish experience, where some large, commercial CSCs
have emerged, despite the presence of CSC federations. A legal
framework complementing self-regulatory efforts may help
prevent CSCs from morphing into profit-driven organisations
and the emergence of ‘shadow clubs’ which seek to produce and
distribute cannabis in a commercial way (Bewley-Taylor et al.,
2014; Decorte, 2015). Such regulatory model could remove
incentives for profit-motivated efforts by clubs to increase
cannabis consumption by banning any advertising and marketing
practices by clubs (such as on pack branding) – which seems to
already be the case in the contexts studied herein; and again, by
imposing a maximum number of members and a maximum
production limit (monthly/annually). Keeping in line with public
health objectives, access, availability and use by youths should
also be minimised (Pacula et al., 2014; Kilmer, 2014).
At the same time, CSCs could retain their current autonomy to
shape the decision-making structure of the club, make decisions
on membership fees, the choice to hire paid staff, the planning of
cannabis production, the selection of strains to be produced, or the
decision to form a federation with other clubs. At the same time,
legal regulation could define the procedure for formal registration
and establishment of the club, establish a maximum number of
members per CSC, the club’s maximum production capacity (in kg?
number of plants?), the maximum number of grams a member can
receive in a given period, the minimum membership criteria (such
as age and a residence criterion), and procedures to ensure
transparency of the activities and the finances of the clubs (e.g. a
crop plan as required in Uruguay, or external accountability
checks). With regards to the registration of cannabis users, other
experiments imposing a registration system – such as the
implementation of the ‘weed pass’ for coffeeshops in The
Netherlands, seem to suggest that many users are reluctant to
formally complete such registration. Current experiences in
Uruguay (where a users’ registry has also been introduced) can
further shed light into this issue.
Belackova et al. (2016) have argued that the Cannabis Social
Club model has the potential to diminish the adverse health risks
resulting from cannabis use through educational activities,
dissemination of information on reducing mental health risks,
and promotion of safe smoking practices. However, there may be
risks associated with sole reliance on self-regulatory practices of
CSCs, given the inherent potential conflict of interest between
profit-making (which is the goal of at least some groups and
individuals in the CSC movement) and accountability (as a crucial
element in the ‘Code of Conduct’) (see: Ritter, 2010). Similarly,
Pacula et al. (2014) have warned for a laissez-faire approach, which
could generate an increase in cannabis misuse and consequent
health and social problems. In order to protect and ensure public
health, a regulatory framework could contain minimal quality
standards for growing cannabis within a club, establish a
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content?) of cannabis products, packaging controls (e.g. childproof
containers) and obligatory information on packaging (based on
established norms for pharmaceutical drugs, and also containing
information about responsible cannabis use, how to minimize
risks, and where to find more information or help).
Unlike cannabis distributors who operate on the illegal market,
many Cannabis Social Clubs are willing to enter into dialogue with
authorities to provide insight in their working methods, in the
framework of the elaboration of a legal regulation of cannabis.
Public health regulations would enable authorities to control the
CSCs in order to ensure their transparent and safe way of working,
and to create an alternative for the black market, preventing the
access of minors to cannabis, help to reduce public expenditure
and generate tax revenue (see also: Pacula et al., 2014). Public
health regulations could also enable the clubs to apply an active
policy of prevention of harms and risks, and to actively promote
safer methods of consumption of cannabis (Ritter, 2010). Any
experiment with regulated Cannabis Social Clubs should also be
tailored to the local context. This implies a discussion about the
location and density of clubs per area (a point taken up in
Uruguayan legislation), about whether or not it is good practice to
allow consumption of cannabis (and/or alcohol) at the venue of the
clubs, and about the distribution procedures (during opening
hours, by order only, through frequent ‘distribution fairs’, etc.).
CSCs too have an interest in such a regulation as it will ensure
legal availability of cannabis to their members, their right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the legal status
of their organisation and activities.
The study presented here obviously has important limitations:
the data used for this analysis were not collected through identical
data collection methods, and stem from local studies in Spain,
Belgium and Uruguay with different research designs. Some of the
issues we mentioned above require more in-depth descriptions of
how CSCs operate on a daily basis. Not all the CSCs in the three
countries were included in our studies; some clubs are of difficult
access or reluctant to participate in empirical research, and it is
well worth trying to find out why. In order to better understand the
strengths and the weaknesses of the CSC model and the lessons for
regulation, analysis of the sociodemographic background, and
consumption patterns of CSC members (before and during CSC
membership) would be very useful, as well as their personal views
and experiences with (one or more) clubs. Furthermore, it
seems important to know which ‘type’ of cannabis users clubs
are attracting today (regular or daily cannabis users, and/or
irregular and occasional users) and to reflect on how legally
regulated cannabis clubs should target different groups of cannabis
users. Similarly, a better knowledge of the background of current
cannabis growers in CSCs would be of added value, as any
transition from a criminalised to a legally regulated framework will
raise important issues with regards to the previous illicit cannabis
growers.
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